Fruits, Nuts, Cigarettes, and the Right to Remain Silent by Esperanza, Christine
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 31
Number 2 Winter 2004 Article 3
1-1-2004
Fruits, Nuts, Cigarettes, and the Right to Remain
Silent
Christine Esperanza
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christine Esperanza, Fruits, Nuts, Cigarettes, and the Right to Remain Silent, 31 Hastings Const. L.Q. 163 (2004).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol31/iss2/3
FRUITS, NUTS, CIGARETTES, AND THE
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
by CHRISTINE ESPERANZA*
I. Introduction
Although the First Amendment is most commonly associated
with the right to speak, it also affords citizens the right not to speak
and protects citizens, in certain situations, from being forced by the
government to finance speech with which they disagree.1 In the to-
bacco industry, some states have imposed a tax on tobacco companies
which compels the companies to unwillingly fund self-vilifying
speech.2 This breed of government-compelled advertising stems from
the community's perception of the alcohol and tobacco companies as
harmful, manipulative industries.3 These regulatory schemes erode
the industries' protected right to promote a legal product because
they force the industry to finance ads that degrade its members for
engaging in a legal activity.4 Because these advertisements are fi-
nanced entirely by a tax on the tobacco industry, they constitute a
* Christine G. Esperanza received her J.D. from University of California, Hastings
College of the Law in 2003. She received her B.A., cum laude in Mass Communi-
cations, with a specialization in Business Administration from the University of
California, Los Angeles in June 1999. From her mass communications studies, she
developed an interest in First Amendment issues. She also served as a legal intern
in the General Felony Section of the United States Department of Justice in Wash-
ington, DC. She is currently an associate at Farella Braun + Martel LLP, and fo-
cuses her practice on employment litigation and counseling.
1 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
2 See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30121-30130 (West 2000) (also known as
Proposition 99); 2001 Ariz. Sess. Laws 313.
3 Kathryn Murphy, Can the Budweiser Frogs be Forced to Sing a New-
Tune?: Compelled Commercial Counter-speech and the First Amendment, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1998).
4 Id. at 1221-22.
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clear case of compelled subsidization of governmental speech that
may violate the First Amendment.
In the agricultural context, the federal government has com-
pelled companies to subsidize speech through a scheme of legislation
called Agricultural Marketing Orders.5 Because these mandatory as-
sessments effectively require agricultural companies to pay for ge-
neric advertising that promotes their competitor's product, some pro-
ducers and retailers have objected to the mandatory assessments.6
There is a strong argument that these marketing orders are unconsti-
tutional under the commercial speech doctrine of the First Amend-
ment.7 The Supreme Court has confronted this question on two occa-
sions, in Glickman,8 and more recently in United Foods.9 These cases
seem irreconcilable in that they are based on similar regulatory
schemes, yet arrive at contrary conclusions." In addition, the Court in
both cases deviated from the Central Hudson test, which was the
"long-standing method of determining constitutional commercial
speech protection."'" In the context of marketing orders, the First
Amendment issues present a convergence of the commercial speech
doctrine and the compelled speech doctrine. Under current doctrinal
principles, regulatory schemes outside the agricultural context may
also be constitutionally impermissible, yet the Court's inconsistent
treatment of compelled speech has left little guidance to scholars, liti-
gators, and lower courts.
In this Note, I will explore the legal implications of United Foods
and discuss whether the Court's ruling can be extended to prevent
government compelled financing of advertisements in the tobacco in-
dustry. First, this note will examine the development of the com-
pelled-commercial speech doctrine and discuss two state regulatory
schemes which may be constitutionally suspect under the United
Foods ruling. Second, this note will argue that the anti-tobacco regu-
latory schemes are distinguishable from the economic regulation in
5 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 ("AAA"), 7 U.S.C. §
602(l) (1997).
6 See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997);
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
7 Kristine M.H. Huether, Preservation of the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
Applying the Central Hudson Test to Compelled Monetary Assessments for Ge-
neric AgriculturalAdvertising, 25 HAMLINE L. REv. 79, 107 (2001).
8 521 U.S. 457.
9 533 U.S. 405.
10 Huether, supra note 7, at 81.
11 Id.
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Glickman. Hence, if United Foods is the controlling precedent, thetobacco tax programs should be classified as a speech regulation enti-tled to First Amendment protection. Third, this note will argue thatanti-tobacco advertisements should not be classified as commercial
speech and thus, should receive a higher level of First Amendment
protection than the marketing orders at issue in Glickman and UnitedFoods. Rather than apply an intermediate scrutiny test normally used
for evaluating commercial speech, the Court should subject theseanti-tobacco schemes to strict scrutiny review. In applying strict scru-tiny, the schemes may violate the First Amendment because the gov-ernment has not narrowly tailored its means for advancing its interest
in reducing tobacco consumption. Finally, this Note will propose thatthe disclosure of health-related information is a less constitutionally
violative alternative the government should adopt to accomplish its
goal of expressing a health message.
II. Background
A. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Commercial Speech
In general, commercial speech falls within the scope of protected
speech under the First Amendment but merits less protection thanother forms of constitutionally guaranteed expression." The Courthas defined commercial speech as "expression related solely to theeconomic interests of the speaker and its audience" and as "speechproposing a commercial transaction." 3 In Virginia State Board ofPharmacy, the Court argued that consumers and the general public
have an interest in commercial information even if the speaker's in-terests are purely economic." Thus, the Court held that First
Amendment protection extends both to "its source and to its recipi-ents." 5 Striking down a Virginia statute that restricted pharmacists
from advertising the prices of prescription drugs, Justice Blackmunemphasized that there may be personal objections as to various ad-vertising, but as long as the United States supports a free marketeconomy and resources are primarily allocated through the private
12 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
"3 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62.
14 Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 756.
15 r
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sector, the "free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
1 6
Acknowledging the relationship between speech interests and eco-
nomic interests, the Court concluded that commercial speech, whose
primary purpose is to further economic objectives, is entitled to First
Amendment protection. 7
In Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission of New York, the Court determined that commercial
speech requires less protection than non-commercial speech and that
the level of protection turns on the nature of the expression and the
governmental interests served by the regulation. 8 In this case, the
Court held that a New York statute banning promotional advertising
by an electric utility was unconstitutional.' 9 However, in striking
down the regulation, the Court did not apply the heightened scrutiny
standard it often applies to restrictions on expression. ° Rather, Jus-
tice Powell developed a four-part intermediate scrutiny test." First,
the judiciary should determine whether the speech concerns lawful,
non-misleading activity deserving of First Amendment protection."
Second, the court should inquire "whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial."23 Third, the regulation must directly advance
the asserted governmental interest.2 4 Finally, the regulation must not
be more extensive than necessary to serve that interest."
The Court applied the Central Hudson test in Zauderer to a dis-
ciplinary ruling against an attorney for advertising infractions.26 Con-
cluding that the advertisements were protected commercial speech,
the Court held that Ohio's restrictions banning advertisements con-
taining advice were unconstitutional.2 ' The Court, however, upheld
Ohio's contingency fee disclosure requirements, stating that warnings
or disclaimers are acceptable to reduce the possibility of consumer
16 Id. at 765.
17 Id. at 769-70.
18 447 U.S. at 563.
19 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571.





25 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626 (1985).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 637-38.
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confusion or deception.
28
In recent cases, however, the Court has applied the Central Hud-
son intermediate scrutiny test so rigorously that it seems to resemble
strict scrutiny review." Thus, because the Court has applied the Cen-
tral Hudson commercial speech analysis inconsistently, it remains un-
clear what kinds of advertising regulations will survive constitutional
scrutiny, particularly when the regulations involve advertisements of
harmful products.0
B. The Compelled Speech Doctrine
The First Amendment not only protects against limitations on
one's speech but against governmentally compelled speech as well.31
The Supreme Court has recognized the premises underlying this prin-
ciple, holding that the First Amendment protects "both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."3  The
Court has rejected the argument that compelled speech is in some
way of less constitutional significance than other intrusions on free
speech, stating that "there is certainly some difference between com-
pelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected
speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the
First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily
comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.,
33
The Court has also recognized that this protection applies to cor-
porations as well as to individuals and prohibits the government from
compelling a corporation to use its own property to disseminate ideas
with which it does not agree. 4 In Pacific Gas and Electric, the Court
invalidated a government order requiring a utility company to include
in its billing envelopes a newsletter from a group whose views op-
28 Id. at 651.
29 See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
30 See, e.g., Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 484 (requiring a more rigorous review of
how advertising restrictions advance a governmental interest); Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761 (1993) (invalidating a prohibition against solicitations by certified
public accountants because the government could not justify the restriction on
mere speculation or conjecture).
31 See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977);
W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
32 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
33 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988).
34 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16
(1986).
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posed the utility. " The government order not only forced the com-
pany to disseminate its opponent's speech, but also put pressure on
the utility to respond, thus forcing the speaker "to affirm in one
breath that which they deny in the next." 6 For corporations, as for
individuals, the right to speak includes within it the choice of what not
to say, and the Court confirmed that "[a]ppellant does not, of course,
have the right to be free from vigorous debate. But it does have the
right to be free from government restrictions that abridge its own
rights in order to 'enhance the relative voice' of its opponents.""
From these principles, it logically follows that First Amendment
protections include an interest in freedom from compulsion to subsi-
dize speech and other expressive activities. In International Associa-
tion of Machinists v. Street, a case involving employees who were le-
gally required against their will to pay union dues, the Supreme Court
recognized that this kind of compelled political support could not be
squared with the First Amendment." The Court held that unions
cannot, over an employee's objection, use his or her dues to support
political activities which the employee opposes."
This principle was extended in Abood, a case involving a public
school teachers' challenge to an agency shop statute that required all
government-employed teachers to pay dues to a teacher's union.'°
The teachers in Abood raised a successful constitutional claim that
they were being compelled to subsidize ideological activities that they
opposed.41 In considering the use of mandatory contributions for po-
litical and ideological purposes, the Court characterized this com-
pelled subsidization as an infringement of the freedom of belief. 2
The Court emphasized that "at the heart of the First Amendment is
the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and
that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and
his conscience rather than coerced by the State.4 3 In essence, forcing
teachers to fund ideological activities they oppose is like forcing them
to affirm a belief they do not share. ' Thus, the Court held that un-
35 id.
36 id.
37 Id. at 14.
38 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
'9 Id. at 768-69.
40 431 U.S. at 209.
41 Id. at 241-42.
42 Id. at 235.
43 Id. at 234-35.
44 Id. at 235.
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ions cannot constitutionally compel funds from employees for the ex-
pression of political or ideological causes that are germane to its du-
ties as a collective-bargaining representative.45
In Keller, the Court confronted another coerced subsidization
challenge.6 Like the union dues in Abood, lawyers are required to
pay state bar dues as a condition of practicing law in California. The
Court unanimously held that the use of mandatory bar dues for po-
litical and ideological activities violated objecting members' First
Amendment rights.47 The Respondent tried to distinguish this case
from Abood on the ground that "compelled association in the context
of labor unions serves only a private economic interest in collective
bargaining while the State Bar serves more substantial' public inter-
ests., 48 The Court, however, held that the guiding principle for de-
termining the constitutionality of bar assessments relating to political
or ideological activities is "whether the challenged expenditures are
necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the
legal profession or 'improving the quality of legal services.' 4, 9 Al-
though the Court employed different standards of scrutiny, the
Court's view of compelled speech at this point seemed to require
freedom from compelled indirect advocacy, or subsidization of oppos-
ing viewpoints.
The Court's treatment of compelled speech changed directions in
Glickman, where the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to
the financing of generic advertising by a marketing board.0 In
Glickman, the Court upheld a regulatory scheme requiring agricul-
tural producers to contribute to generic advertising of California nec-
tarines, peaches, and plums.5' Although cases preceding Glickman af-
forded increasing protection to commercial speech, the Glickman
majority held that an analysis of compelled advertising in this context
did not raise First Amendment issues.2
The Court reasoned that commercial speech engaged in by a
marketing board was not entitled to the same level of protection as
political speech engaged in by unions. 3 Justice Stevens offered three
41 Id. at 235-36.
46 496 U.S. at 1.
41 Id. at 16.
41 Id. at 13.
49 Id. at 14 (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)).
'0 521 U.S. at 457.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 469-70; See also Keller, 496 U.S. 1; Abood, 431 U.S. 209.
" 521 U.S. at 469-70.
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reasons for upholding the regulatory scheme. 4 First, the marketing
order did not prevent any producer from communicating his own dis-
tinct message.5 Second, the orders did not compel any person to en-
gage in actual or symbolic speech. 6 Finally, the Court sought to dis-
tinguish Glickman from Abood and Keller on the grounds that the
scheme did not compel producers to finance political or ideological
speech 7 Thus, the Court avoided any First Amendment analysis by
characterizing the marketing order as an economic regulation rather
than a commercial speech regulation. 8 After Glickman, it was not
entirely clear how the Supreme Court would rule on the constitution-
ality of another regulatory scheme which compelled subsidization of
governmental speech.
Four years later, a case of similar facts reached the opposite re-
sult. In United Foods, a mushroom producer successfully challenged
assessments used to create generic advertisements promoting mush-
room sales.5 9 United Foods, a company who grows and markets
mushrooms, challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute that
imposed a surcharge on all mushroom sales to finance a mushroom
industry "council." 6 The council's sole purpose was to supervise use
of the proceeds from the surcharge, which funded research and adver-
tising relating to mushrooms. 6' Although the assessments were to be
used for "projects of mushroom promotion, research, consumer in-
formation, and industry information," most of the money raised was
spent on generic advertising promoting the consumption of mush-
rooms.
62
United Foods rejected this scheme and refused to pay the forced
subsidy. 3 United Foods argued that generic advertising undermined
their own marketing efforts for their branded mushrooms.64 The
Court ruled in favor of the mushroom grower, holding that "the man-
dated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set forth
in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who
54 id.
" Id at 469.
56 Id.
17 Id. at 469-70.
58 Id. at 470.
9 533 U.S. at 405.
60 Id. at 408.
61 id.
62 id.
63 Id. at 408, 411.
64 Id. at411.
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object to speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the
group by law or necessity.""
Rather than expressly overrule Glickman, the Court sought to
distinguish Glickman by framing the issue in United Foods as
"whether the government may underwrite and sponsor speech with a
certain viewpoint using special subsidies exacted from a designated
class of persons, some of whom object to the idea being advanced."
66
The Court, however, did not expressly apply any First Amendment
test to the statute before rejecting it. Thus, rather than clarifying the
appropriate standard for evaluating regulatory schemes which compel
subsidization of commercial speech, the Court's ruling in United
Foods has left the constitutionality of other regulatory schemes in an
uncertain state.
Hence, outside the agricultural context, whether United Foods or
Glickman should be used as precedent for preventing government
compelled financing of anti-tobacco ads will ultimately depend on
whether the Court adequately distinguished Glickman from United
Foods and if so, whether the ads will be analogized to the economic
regulation in Glickman as opposed to the speech regulation in United
Foods.
C. The Court's Efforts to Distinguish Glickman From United Foods
Though the regulation in United Foods seemed to have the same
effect as the marketing order in Glickman, the Court focused on a
central difference: while the mandatory assessments in Glickman
were ancillary to a comprehensive program restricting marketplace
autonomy, in United Foods, "the advertising itself, far from being an-
cillary, is the principal object of the regulatory scheme."67 The Court
distinguished the mushroom statute on the grounds that mushroom
growers were not forced to associate as a group which makes coop-
erative decisions beyond advertising.' One may interpret the two
seemingly conflicting decisions to convey that while compelled asso-
ciation is impermissible, it is allowable when incidental to legitimate
government action. Thus, the Court's holding implies that the man-
dated support in United Foods violated the mushroom grower's First
Amendment rights because expression was the primary object of
65 United Foods 533 U.S. at 413 (referring to Abood, 431 U.S. at 209; Keller,
496 U.S. at 1).
66 Id. at 410.
67 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411-12.
68 Id. at412-13.
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compulsory funding.
69
In United Foods, the Court pointed out that funds raised through
the Mushroom Act were almost exclusively used for speech, whereas
the producers in Glickman were "bound together and required by
statute to market their products according to cooperative rules."7 °
The Court found that in Glickman, the producers' "mandated partici-
pation in an advertising program with a particular message was a logi-
cal concomitant of a valid scheme of economic regulation."7 The
Court contrasted this with the scheme in United Foods where there
was no heavy regulation in the mushroom market beyond the collec-
tion and disbursement of advertising funds.7 2 "The mushroom grow-
ing business is unregulated.., and the mushroom market has not
been collectivized, exempted from antitrust laws, subjected to a uni-
form price, or otherwise subsidized through price supports or restric-
tions on supply."73 Thus, the Court concluded that the marketing
scheme in Glickman had distinctive features, namely that it was part
of a larger comprehensive regulatory scheme, which removed the case
from First Amendment review. Although the exact constitutional
significance of the existence of a complex regulatory scheme is not
clearly articulated in either opinion, the reasoning exists nonetheless.
To reconcile the Court's seemingly incongruous pattern in these
cases, one could argue that the marketing orders also differed based
on the government's policy reasons for creating the schemes. In
Glickman, the scheme was driven by an economic policy that Con-
gress believed was necessary to maintain a stable market for Califor-
nia tree fruit.74 By displacing competition and creating an antitrust
exemption for growers, handlers, and processors, the scheme regu-
lated both the supply and demand of California tree fruit.75 In United
Foods, the program's goal of expanding existing mushroom markets
was cultivated for the purpose of overcoming consumer mispercep-
tions and "fears about the safety of eating mushrooms.
7 6
Furthermore, one could argue that government intervention is
more legitimate in Glickman because the companies were less likely,
and possibly incapable, of accomplishing the government's objective
69 Id.
70 Id. at 412.
71 id.
72 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412.
73 Id. at 413.
74 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 414.
71 Id. at 412.
76 Id. at 422 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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of regulating the tree fruit market through their individual voluntary
efforts. On the other hand, mushroom growers, through individual
advertising, are capable of promoting their products and dispelling
any myths about mushrooms. This distinction suggests that regulating
the economy's supply and demand of certain commodities necessi-
tates a greater degree of compelled association than simply providing
consumer information to promote the sale of a product. One could
infer that when compelled speech is ancillary to a constitutionally
permissible scheme of forced association necessary to accomplish the
government's objective, the Court is less likely to disrupt the scheme,
even if it implicates some First Amendment interests.
III. State Regulatory Schemes Which May be Constitutionally
Suspect Under the United Foods Ruling
A. California's Proposition 99
In November 1988, California instituted Proposition 99 ("Prop
99"), the "Cigarette and Tobacco Tax Initiative," which imposed an
additional excise tax of one and one-fourth cents ($.0125) upon dis-
tributors of tobacco products.77 In addition, the initiative imposed a
new excise tax to be determined by the Board of Equalization on
other types of tobacco products, such as cigars, chewing tobacco, pipe
tobacco, and snuff."
Prop 99 was subsequently implemented through Part 13, Article
2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which creates a fund known as
the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund (hereinafter "the
Fund").79 The Fund is entirely financed by the assessments collected
from the tax imposed on cigarette distributors.' Prop 99 specifies
that money in the Fund is to be used only for a series of particular
purposes, including treatment of diseases associated with tobacco use,
fire prevention, tobacco-related disease research and "[t]obacco-
related school and community health education programs."'" To ac-
complish this, revenues from the additional taxes are placed into the
77 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 30121-30130 (West 2000). Proposition 99 is
also known as the "Tobacco Tax and Health Protection Act of 1988."
78 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 30123.
79 CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 30121(a).
80 Id.
81 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 30122(a).
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Fund, which is divided into six separate accounts. 82 One account in
particular, the "Health Education Account," is available only for the
"prevention and reduction of tobacco use among children, through
school and community health education programs."83
Health and Safety Code section 104375 directs the Department
of Health Education to establish a program to reduce tobacco use "by
conducting health education interventions and behavior change pro-
grams."' This includes contracting with "one or more qualified agen-
cies" for "production and implementation of an ongoing public
awareness of tobacco related disease by the development of informa-
tional campaign using a variety of media approaches. 8 ' The statute
specifically states that "[a]ny media campaign funded with this part
shall stress the importance of both preventing the initiation of to-
bacco use and quitting smoking and shall be based on professional
market research and surveys necessary to determine the most effec-
tive method of diminishing tobacco use among specified target popu-
lations.
86
Shortly after Prop 99 became effective, and particularly over re-
cent years, print and televised messages funded by Prop 99 have
turned from exposing the risks of tobacco use to debasing the tobacco
companies. Often, ads charge the tobacco companies as targeting
children with their advertising, and manipulating the public. In es-
sence, the tobacco companies are forced to financially sponsor ads
which attack not only their product, but them directly. If these anti-
industry ads are created pursuant to Health and Safety Code section
104375 and financed by the Health Education Account, then use of
Prop 99 revenues may constitute a violation of the distributors' con-
stitutional right to be free from compelled speech.
B. Arizona Statute Section 36-772
Like California, Arizona has implemented Section 36-772, a to-
bacco tax program whose operation mirrors Prop 99.87 Pursuant to
the Arizona Tax Code Section 42-3251, the total excise tax levied on
the tobacco industry is two cents ($0.02) for each cigarette, amounting
82 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 30122(b) (setting forth the six accounts, enti-
tled: Health Education, Hospital Services, Physician Services, Research, Public
Resources, and General Purposes).
83 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 30122(b)(1).
84 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104375(a) (West 2000).
85 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104375(e)(1) (West 2000).
86 id.
87 ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-772(A) (West 2004).
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to forty cents ($0.40) for each pack of cigarettes.'
Similar to Prop 99, Section 36-772 created a "Health Education
Account," which receives twenty-three percent of the revenues de-
posited in the Tobacco Tax and Health Care Fund. 9 This account,
like Prop 99, funds programs "for the prevention and reduction of to-
bacco use, through public health education programs, including com-
munity based education, cessation, evaluation and other programs to
discourage tobacco use."' The statute then instructs the Department
of Health Services to develop and deliver "education programs that
are designed to prevent or reduce tobacco use including radio, televi-
sion, or print media costs."9' Section 36-772 effectively compels to-
bacco companies to subsidize an anti-tobacco advertising campaign,
thus presenting the same First Amendment concerns as California's
Prop 99.
IV. Application of the Compelled Speech Doctrine to Anti-
Industry Ads
The First Amendment interests threatened by anti-industry ads
are more substantial than many have recognized. Typically, commer-
cial speech claims against the industry have involved government re-
strictions or bans on advertisements.92 However, in the Prop 99 and
Section 36-772 context, the First Amendment issues present a conver-
gence of the commercial speech doctrine and the compelled speech
doctrine. If there is any constitutional significance to the distinction
drawn in United Foods between a scheme of marketing regulation
and a statute whose primary objective is speech, it is not the degree of
compulsion involved. In both cases, funds are extracted by the gov-
ernment for the purpose of subsidizing speech with which the speak-
ers disagree. Whether United Foods or Glickman can be used as
precedent for preventing government compelled financing of anti-
tobacco ads will ultimately depend on whether the Court adequately
distinguished Glickman from United Foods, and if so, whether the
88 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 42-3251 (2001) (imposing an excise tax on other types
of tobacco products, such as cigars, chewing tobacco, smoking tobacco, and snuff,
but excluding tobacco powder or tobacco products used exclusively for agricultural
or horticultural purposes and unfit for human consumption).
89 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-772(A).
90 ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 36-772(A).
91 ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-772(C)(2)(c).
92 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); 44 Liquormart,
517 U.S. at 484.
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states' advertising schemes are distinguishable from either case.
A. The State Regulatory Schemes Compelling Tobacco Companies to
Subsidize Anti-Industry Ads are Distinguishable From the
Regulatory Scheme Upheld in Glickman.
Compelled funding of speech under the state regulatory schemes
is distinguishable from Glickman in two respects. First, marketing
orders in Glickman were part of a large, complex statutory mecha-
nism aimed at an already regulated market. 93 The Court held that
First Amendment interests were not implicated because the scheme,
taken as a whole, should be classified as economic, rather than
speech, regulation.94 In contrast, Prop 99 and Section 36-772 provide
far less governmental regulatory power. Although the funds under
both statutes are deposited in various accounts and used for several
different purposes, none of the purposes include direct governmental
regulation of the tobacco companies' conduct.95
The producers in Glickman required to finance speech as part of
a larger scheme were granted a presumably beneficial economic ad-
vantage in return: control over the market that might otherwise be
unavailable to them. In conjunction with the compelled funding re-
quirements, the marketing orders also displaced competition and
provided an antitrust exemption.96 The tobacco industry, on the other
hand, is not a regulated market warranting the same economic con-
cerns as the tree fruit market in Glickman. The anti-tobacco regula-
tory schemes do not confer any particular legal advantage on their
contributors. Therefore, the mere fact that Prop 99 and Section 36-
772 involve the financing of other activities besides speech should be
of little constitutional significance.
Second, the state anti-tobacco measures are distinguishable from
the marketing orders in Glickman because the compelled funding of
speech required by Prop 99 and Section 36-772 is not ancillary to a
forced association scheme. In Glickman, the regulatory scheme
forced tree fruit companies to act cooperatively as a non-competing
entity." Upholding the scheme, the Court suggested that coerced
subsidies for speech enjoy a greater presumption of validity when part
93 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469.
" Id. at 477.
95 In the Prop 99 context, the Fund is divided into six accounts entitled:
Health Education, Hospital Services, Physician Services, Research, Public Re-
sources, and General Purposes.
96 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 446.
97 521 U.S. at475.
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of a constitutionally permissible forced association.
While the First Amendment unquestionably protects the indi-
vidual producer's right to advertise its own brands, the statute
[was] designed to further the economic interests of the produc-
ers as a group. The basic policy decision that underlies the en-
tire statute rests on the assumption that in volatile markets for
agricultural commodities the public will best be served by com-
pelling cooperation among producers .... 9
Far from acting cooperatively, tobacco companies actively com-
pete to gain a share of the market. While state statutes compel all to-
bacco companies to subsidize the anti-industry ads, the companies are
not required to act as a collective entity. Therefore, the Court should
recognize these key differences between anti-tobacco regulatory
schemes and the marketing orders, and hold that Glickman should
not be the applicable precedent used to uphold Prop 99 and Section
36-772.
B. Government Compelled Advertising is Compelled Speech Entitled
to First Amendment Protection.
Reflecting on the Court's lack of consensus on why commercial
speech should be protected, scholars and commentators have re-
vealed wide support for the notion that a federally-compelled adver-
tising campaign would violate the First Amendment.' ° "In refusing to
recognize a First Amendment issue [in Glickman], the Court blatantly
ignored precedent establishing that advertising is speech, that coerc-
ing an individual to finance another's speech amounts to coercing
speech, and that the First Amendment prohibits compelled speech as
it does compelled silence."'' In United Foods and Glickman, Justice
Thomas reiterated this view that "paying money for the purposes of
advertising involves speech, and that compelling speech raises a First
Amendment issue just as much as restricting speech."'
' 2
98 Id.
99 Id. (emphasis added).
100 See Aaron A. Goach, Free Speech and Freer Speech, 21 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 623, 632 (1998); 111 HARV. L. REV. 319 (1997); Scott Joachim, See-
ing Beyond the Smoke and Mirrors: A Proposal for the Abandonment of the Com-
mercial Speech Doctrine and an Analysis of Recent Tobacco Advertising Regula-
tions, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 517, 520 (1997). Although the regulatory
schemes discussed in this Note are state mandated as opposed to federally man-
dated, they still pose First Amendment concerns.
101 Goach, supra note 100, at 632.
102 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 418-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Glick-
man, 521 U.S. at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
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Predicting that a "future, more activist Court" might broaden
Glickman to justify compelled speech in other industries," one
scholar also warned that Glickman might provide constitutional sup-
port for other federally mandated advertising programs that oppose
the interests of the target industry.
For example, the federal government might adopt an anti-
tobacco advertising campaign and finance it through mandatory
assessments levied on each tobacco company based on its retail
market share .... These industries would surely object to being
forced to sponsor speech in direct opposition to their interests,
but it is unclear whether under Glickman such an objection
would constitute a "crisis of conscience" sufficiently serious to
justify First Amendment scrutiny in the eyes of the Court.' °
Another law review article echoes the same warning:
Ultimately, the danger of the Court's decision in Glickman is
that it suggests that government may have "free reign" to "force
payment for a whole variety of expressive conduct that it could
not restrict." The danger is that instead of taking responsibility
for messages that it wishes to foster-and being held account-
able by the public for using tax dollars to do so-government
can surreptitiously communicate its messages through the pock-
etbooks of private speakers.05
Therefore, the Court should recognize that the speech elements
present in the anti-tobacco regulatory schemes impose a constitution-
ally impermissible infringement on the rights of the speakers who are
forced to pay for the government's message.
C. United Foods Provides the Governing Standard for Evaluating the
Constitutionality of Anti-Tobacco Regulatory Schemes.
Applying the Court's ruling in United Foods to the tobacco con-
text, an anti-industry ad campaign financed by mandatory assess-
ments levied on tobacco companies is constitutionally suspect under
the First Amendment. In Arizona and California, the revenues from
increased excise taxes are placed in a fund, which is used in part to
create counter-advertising that directly attacks the industry.'1 Pre-
sumably, these targeted industries object to being forced to sponsor
speech in direct opposition to their interests. Like the mushroom
103 Goach, supra note 100, at 636.
104 id.
105 Leading Cases, Commercial Speech-Compelled Advertising, 111 HARV. L.
REv. 319, 329 (1997) (referring to Souter, J. and Thomas, J. dissenting opinions in
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 477, 506).
106 1990 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 50 (Deering); 2001 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 313
(West).
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growers in United Foods, tobacco manufacturers and distributors
have no choice but to pay the tax if they are to sell their products.
In essence, there are two reasons why the anti-tobacco regula-
tions should be distinguished from Glickman and analogized to
United Foods. First, the speech compelled in Glickman, as a result of
being part of a complex marketing regulation, conferred an economic
advantage on its contributors."7 In both United Foods and the to-
bacco context, the regulation schemes do not provide an antitrust ex-
emption or any other economic benefit to their contributors.
10 8
Therefore, the Court should recognize the difference between a regu-
lation that couples a presumably economic benefit with a burden as
opposed to a scheme that solely imposes a burden.
Second, the compelled speakers in United Foods and in the to-
bacco context are not subject to any forced association as are the pro-
ducers in Glickman. While the mushroom growers are required to
promote all mushrooms generically, they are still active competitors
in the mushroom market. This is evidenced by United Foods' goal to
establish value in their distinct brand of mushrooms. Like the mush-
room growers, tobacco companies actively compete to gain market
share. Thus, one could argue that government intervention in a non-
competitive market as a form of economic regulation should be dis-
tinguished from government regulation in a competitive market,
where advertising is the primary means of gaining a competitive ad-
vantage.
Furthermore, Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion in United
Foods, specifically pointed out his fear that the majority's view would
set dangerous precedent because it would call into question the con-
stitutionality of anti-tobacco regulatory schemes."
The Court, in applying stricter First Amendment standards and
finding them violated, sets an unfortunate precedent. That
precedent suggests, perhaps requires, striking down any similar
program that, for example, would require tobacco companies to
contribute to an industry fund for advertising the harms of
smoking .... 0
Prop 99 and Section 36-772 are prime examples of the regulatory
schemes Breyer warns will be "infect[ed] ... with constitutional
107 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 476.
108 Compare United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412, with CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §
30121 (West 2000), and 2001 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 313.
109 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 428.
110 Id.
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doubt" as a result of the majority's rule.111 From this, it is reasonable
to infer that Justice Breyer believes that the majority's ruling in
United Foods can be extended to the tobacco context.
There is, however, a notable distinction between the anti-tobacco
regulatory schemes and the regulatory scheme in United Foods.
While speech is obviously an important function of Prop 99 and Sec-
tion 36-772, it is not the primary object of the scheme, as in the Mush-
room Act. By statute, twenty to twenty-three percent of the revenues
collected by the tax schemes are used for educational, or speech pur-
112poses. Although the Court in United Foods did not state the exact
percentage of the assessments used to fund speech, the Court indi-
cated that "most moneys [sic] ... [were] spent on generic advertis-
ing.' '.. There is no indication, however, that the result in United
Foods would have been different if a larger percentage of the col-
lected funds were devoted to research, the other potential purpose of
the statute's assessment. Thus, the mere fact that speech is not the
principal object of the anti-tobacco regulatory schemes should not
render the United Foods' ruling inapplicable.
Recognizing the distinctions between Glickman and United
Foods, the Court should find that Prop 99 and Section 36-772 ads, fi-
nanced entirely by a tax on the tobacco industry, should be analo-
gized to the speech regulation in United Foods, which was held to be a
constitutionally impermissible subsidization of governmental speech.
Debate over whether the Court adequately distinguished Glickman in
United Foods has left the constitutionality of compelled commercial
speech in an uncertain state. The tobacco ads, however, are only
governed by the United Foods holding to the extent that they should
be classified as a speech rather than an economic regulation. Once
classified as compelled speech, the Court should next evaluate the na-
ture of the speech the tobacco companies are being compelled to sub-
sidize.
D. The Nature of the Speech at Issue
1. The Commercial! Non-commercial Speech Distinction
With varying degrees of scrutiny used to evaluate the constitu-
tionality of commercial speech, commercial speech jurisprudence re-
111 Id.
112 CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 30124(b)(1); 2001 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 313.
113 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 408 (emphasis added).
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mains in an uncertain state."14 In both Glickman and United Foods,
Justice Thomas wrote separately to emphasize his continued dis-
agreement with the use of the Central Hudson balancing test and the
discounted weight given to commercial speech generally."5 More-
over, scholars advocating abandonment of the commercial/ non-
commercial distinction have widely criticized the Glickman deci-
sion.. 6 "By embracing both anti-paternalism rhetoric in some com-
mercial speech cases and pro-paternalism results in others, the Court
provided itself with precedent to do anything it pleased with respect
to advertising. '' 17
Because of the seeming inconsistency among the compelled
speech line of cases, the Glickman majority has been criticized for its
failure to recognize the First Amendment implications of compelled
commercial speech regulations: "While Abood undoubtedly dealt
with political speech, a close reading of the case illustrates that the
Glickman Court read its holding too narrowly.""..8  However, the
Court itself has acknowledged that "nothing in the First Amendment
or our cases ... makes the question whether the adjective 'political'
can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional in-
quiry."'" 9
Moreover, the significance of the nature of the speech in the ad-
vertising regulations seems unclear based on the Court's reasoning in
Glickman and United Foods. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in
Glickman seemed to rely on the commercial/ non-commercial speech
distinction in upholding the regulation.2  Stevens distinguished
Glickman from Machinists, Abood, and Keller on the ground that the
advertising regulation in Glickman did not "compel the producers to
endorse or finance any political or ideological views.' 12' In United
114 See generally Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 525; Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 484;
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
".. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 504; United Foods, 533 U.S. at 418-19; See also Li-
quormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (criticizing Cent. Hudson, 477 U.S. at 557).
116 See Goach, supra note 100; Huether, supra note 7.
117 Nicole B. Cesarez, Don't Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Commercial
Speech and the First Amendment, 63 Mo. L. REv. 929, 939 (1998).
118 Dave Smith, Forced Advertising: Free Speech or Not Even?, 33 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 779, 790 (1998) (examining the history, merits, and implications
of the Supreme Court's decision in Glickman).
"9 Abood, 431 U.S. at 232.
120 521 U.S. at 469-70.
121 id.
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Foods, the Court struck down the compelled advertising scheme
while recognizing that it was commercial speech.'
Therefore, it remains unclear what level of First Amendment
protection the Court is willing to afford compelled "commercial"
speech. Applying this rationale to the Prop 99 or Section 36-772 con-
text, the anti-industry ads, if classified as "commercial" speech, may
be entitled to less First Amendment protection.
2. The Government's Message in Anti-Industry Ads is Both Commercial
and Political.
In determining the level of scrutiny to apply, the Court must first
assess the nature of the speech under review. While is it unclear what
level of protection commercial speech merits, political and ideological
speech has always been afforded the highest level of First Amend-
ment protection. Although the Court in United Foods did not ex-
pressly apply a particular First Amendment test to the Mushroom Act
before striking it down, the Court noted that the regulation com-
pelled funding of "commercial" speech.' The generic advertising
under the Mushroom Act fits squarely into the definition of commer-
cial speech because it is expression related to the economic interests
of the mushroom grower and its consumers.'
The tobacco ads, by contrast, should not be classified as purely
commercial speech because their purpose is not solely to propose a
commercial transaction. The asserted purpose of California's and
Arizona's regulatory schemes is to reduce tobacco consumption in
order to promote health and safety.'25 Although the ads created are
intended to reduce the economic transactions between tobacco com-
panies and consumers, the statutes' ultimate goal is to promote a
health, rather than economic policy. Hence, the anti-industry ads
should be characterized as "political" or "ideological" speech.
Anti-tobacco advertisements exemplify the overlap between
politics and commercialism.
The recent wars against tobacco have sparked massive advertis-
ing and counter-advertising between governments, both state and
federal, and the tobacco companies. 26 While the first tobacco ads
122 533 U.S. at 412.
123 533 U.S. at 415.
124 Id.
125 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 30121; 2001 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 313.
126 Scott Joachim, Note, Seeing Beyond the Smoke and Mirrors: A Proposal
for the Abandonment of the Commercial Speech Doctrine and an Analysis of Re-
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produced may have been solely to propose a commercial transaction,
tobacco has evolved into one of the most controversial political issues
today.127 The government has "inevitably create[d] for itself a catch-
22" by fervently regulating a product that was once purely commer-
cial, it has coerced the tobacco companies into the political arena. 2 8
Because the tobacco ads and anti-tobacco ads contain political ide-
ologies, they circumvent the purely commercial speech category.
Thus, one could argue that the tobacco companies' ads and the gov-
ernment's anti-industry ads that respond to them interlace both com-
mercialism and politics.
The recent anti-industry ads created by Prop 99 and Section 36-
772 present an even more compelling case of political or ideological
speech. Beyond informing consumers of the detrimental health risks
associated with tobacco consumption, these ads have included per-
sonal attacks vilifying the tobacco industry. 129 For example, a radio ad
featured a Lorillard employee being called and asked if he wanted to
buy dog urine as a source of urea for cigarettes.3 ° In short, anti-
industry ads convey a simple government message: tobacco compa-
nies are bad, and thus consumers should not buy their products.
Far from promoting an economic transaction, this speech fur-
thers the government's policy and ideology against the tobacco indus-
try. Although advocates of Prop 99 and Section 36-772 would proba-
bly characterize the ads as truthful representations of industry
conduct, the charged terms used by the ads and the plain effort to in-
sult the industry would seem to stamp them as "political," "ideologi-
cal," or at a minimum, as opinion rather than fact. Infused with po-
litical and ideological messages, anti-industry ads should be subjected
to more stringent First Amendment scrutiny than commercial speech.
E. The Court Should Apply Strict Scrutiny
While an intermediate scrutiny analysis may have been the ap-
propriate standard for determining the level of First Amendment pro-
tection in the context of compelled monetary assessments for generic
advertising of agricultural products, a regulation scheme which com-
pels funding of the anti-tobacco ads should be subject to a more strin-
cent Tobacco Advertising Regulations, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 517, 544
(1997).
127 Id.
128 Joachim, supra note 126, at 544.
129 Ira Teinowitz, Cigarette Giant Saves Anti-Tobacco Ad Group, AD AGE, 1
(February 19, 2002) at http:www.adage.com/news.cms?newsld=34065.
130 Id. at 8.
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gent standard. While speech in generic advertising is clearly commer-
cial in nature, the Court should recognize the political and ideological
nature of the anti-industry ads, and thus subject the regulatory
schemes to strict scrutiny review.
1. The Anti-Industry Ads Serve a Compelling State Interest
There is no doubt that promoting healthand safety is a compel-
ling state interest. Prop 99 and Section 36-772 assert each state's in-
terest in reducing tobacco consumption in order to promote the
health and safety of their citizens."' In particular, the Health Educa-
tion Accounts, which directly fund the anti-industry ads, was created
to accomplish the states' compelling interest in educating the public
about the effects of tobacco consumption, thus encouraging consum-
ers to make informed decisions about whether or not to smoke.132
In the tobacco context, legislative concerns involve a combina-
tion of health, safety, and economic factors. The government should
have no difficulty establishing its compelling interest in shifting the
economic burden of smoking, increasing cigarette prices, generating
negative publicity regarding tobacco-related disease, and forcing the
tobacco industry to acknowledge the causal connection between
smoking and cancer and other diseases. Thus, the state regulatory
schemes should pass the first prong of a strict scrutiny review with
ease.
2. Anti-Industry Ads are Not Narrowly Tailored to Serve the State's
Compelling Interest
Although Prop 99 and Section 36-772 should have no difficulty
satisfying the first part of strict scrutiny review, the anti-industry ads
created pursuant to the regulatory schemes infringe on the speakers'
First Amendment rights because they are not narrowly tailored to ac-
complish the government's compelling interest. These ads provide an
ill fit for accomplishing the government's goal because they explicitly
disparage the industry, and thus operate beyond their objective of
discouraging smoking. Although advertising may be an effective
means of educating the public about the health risks associated with
tobacco consumption, anti-industry ads are not necessary to convey
the government's message. Without debating the effectiveness of the
ads, one could argue that compelling advertising as a means of sup-
pressing demand of a legal product constitutes an unnecessary in-
131 CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 30121; 2001 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 313.
132 CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 30122.
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fringement on First Amendment values.
Consequently, if the government cannot compel contributions to
fund anti-industry ads, there are other less constitutionally violative
options available to accomplish the government's goal of expressing a
health message. If the goal is to suppress demand, the states have al-
ternatives to achieve this end that do not involve compelling or sup-
pressing any speech.' One alternative would be for the government
to propagandize against the product or practice using general treasury
funds.' If the government seeks to send a message denigrating an
industry, it should do so with its own funds, rather than force that in-
dustry to fund its message."'
Another alternative would be for the government to generate
negative publicity through advertising that focuses on the product
rather than the industry itself. Regulatory schemes like Prop 99 and
Section 36-772 could be modified to permit government to compel
funding of health warnings or informational speech, but restrict com-
pelled funding of political opinions, such as anti-industry ads. Some
may argue that health warnings and anti-industry ads are equally
problematic forms of compelled speech under the First Amendment
because the tobacco industry has disagreed with both types of mes-
sages. However, there is a significant difference between disclosure
of health facts and anti-industry ads, which convey a political opinion.
While one can easily dispute a political opinion, it is much more
difficult to dispute factual assertions supported by well-documented
research. Over the past two decades, published studies have revealed
sobering statistics reflecting the profound dangers inherent in the use
of tobacco.36 Studies have shown that tobacco remains the largest
133 Kathleen Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Impli-
cations of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 141-42 (1996).
134 Sullivan, supra note 133, at 141-42 (citing Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518-
528 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
135 Although this is an option in all compelled speech cases, it is an unlikely
alternative in this context.
136 Daniel Helberg, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Restrictions
on Cigarette Advertising Under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1219, 1223 (1996) (citing Substance Abuse and Mental Health Serv. Admin.,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., Nat'l Household Survey on Drug Abuse:
Population Estimates 1993, Publ'n No. 94-3017 (1994) at 89, 95; Cigarette Smok-
ing Among Adults - United States, 1993, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 925, 925-30 (1994); Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life -
United States, 1990, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 645, 645 (1993);
Institute of Medicine, Committee on Preventing Nicotine Addiction in Children
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preventable cause of illness and premature death.3 7 Studies have
shown that each year, 400,000 Americans die from smoking-related
illnesses.'8 Research conducted and documented by physicians, sci-
entists, and public health experts has publicized the very real and sub-
stantial dangers of tobacco consumption in both individual and socie-
tal terms.
Although the tobacco industry may quarrel with the validity and
reliability of any report or study conveying the health risks of smok-
ing, they can not dispute the fact that studies have been conducted
and have drawn these conclusions. On the other hand, there are far
less, if any, studies or documented evidence revealing that the to-
bacco industry is mean, manipulative, and deceitful. Far from being a
fact, the anti-industry ads conveying government's message express a
political message, or at a minimum, an opinion.
Furthermore, there is a fundamental difference between disclos-
ing a fact and promoting a policy upon which reasonable minds may
differ. While factual health statistics provide consumers the opportu-
nity to make an informed choice, a political opinion about an indus-
try's practices deprives the public of the opportunity to form individ-
ual opinions. Further, requiring the tobacco industry to disclose facts
is consistent with the extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech, where speech is principally justified by its value
to consumers.13 9 There is a strong argument that health information is
of greater value to consumers than are opinions of corrupt industry
practices. In addition, while the regulatory schemes may infringe on
the tobacco indutry's First Amendment rights, the industry should not
be permitted to conceal facts by hiding behind the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court itself has advocated disclosure requirements
as an alternative that is less burdensome on an individual's First
Amendment rights.' 4° Recognizing that speech compulsion should re-
ceive the same protection as speech suppression, the Court articu-
lated that regulating advertising represents a legitimate governmental
and Youths, Growing Up Tobacco Free: Preventing Nicotine Addiction in Chil-
dren and Youths 4 (Barbara S. Lynch & Richard J, Bonnie eds., 1994)).
137 Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life - United States, 1990, 42
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 645, 645 (1993).
138 Id. Compare this statistic with the 250,000 Americans who die each year
from AIDS, alcohol, murders, car accidents, suicides, illegal drugs, and fires com-
bined.
139 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
140 Id.
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goal.' However, in advancing its goal, the government should em-
ploy the least restrictive means necessary to prevent any unnecessary
infringement upon a speaker's First Amendment rights. Writing for
the court, Justice White stated that "because disclosure requirements
trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interest than do flat
prohibitions on speech, [warnings] or [disclaimers] might be appro-
priately required ... in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer
confusion or deception."'42 White recognized that while disclosure
requirements still implicate an advertiser's First Amendment rights,
they are less of an infringement, and he explained, "We recognize
that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might
offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial
speech. But we hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately pro-
tected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to
the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers.
143
The Court recommendation in Zauderer seems applicable to the
tobacco context where disclosure requirements would advance the
government's goal of preventing deception to consumers by providing
the public with valuable health information about a harmful, yet legal
product. While anti-industry ads are more extensive than necessary
to accomplish the goal of reducing tobacco consumption, health warn-
ings directly advance the government's interest without unduly bur-
dening the tobacco industry's First Amendment rights. Although the
tobacco industry refuses to acknowledge the causal connection be-
tween smoking and numerous health diseases, they cannot contest the
fact that studies have concluded that smoking is detrimental to one's
health. Thus, compelling the tobacco industry to fund health infor-
mation as opposed to anti-industry ads would pose less of an in-
fringement on the industry's First Amendment rights.
V. Conclusion
If the Court's holding in United Foods is extended beyond the
agricultural context, then compelled anti-industry ads funded by the
tobacco industry would violate the First Amendment rights of those
who seek to promote the sale of products that are legal, yet deemed
harmful to society. Regulation schemes, like the ones established in
California and Arizona, stem from increased public pressure on the
government to take counteracting measures against the perceived
141 Id.
142 Id. (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)).
141 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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danger caused by alcohol and tobacco advertising." However, the
decision to reduce cigarette consumption by compelling the tobacco
industry to fund anti-industry ads sacrifices First Amendment princi-
ples and personal autonomy in the name of political expediency.
The government should have no difficulty establishing its com-
pelling interest in shifting the economic burden of smoking, increas-
ing cigarette prices, generating negative publicity regarding tobacco-
related disease, and forcing the tobacco industry to acknowledge the
causal connection between smoking and cancer and other diseases.
Moreover, there is little doubt regarding the dangers of smoking and
the power of the media to influence buying behavior.
Although consumer protection, particularly in the tobacco con-
text, provides the underlying rationale for commercial speech regula-
tion, compelled contributions for anti-industry ads are constitution-
ally impermissible because the government has less intrusive
alternatives to accomplish its public health interests. The most viable
option for the government to advance its interest in promoting health
and reducing tobacco consumption would be to require tobacco com-
panies to finance advertisements that disclose facts about its products,
but not compel the companies to promote an anti-industry policy. Al-
though there is still some controversy as to the validity or reliability of
studies indicating the health dangers associated with tobacco con-
sumption, health warnings are based on volumes of scientific evidence
and published studies conducted over many years. There is much less
evidentiary support for the proposition that tobacco companies are
deceitful, mean-spirited and manipulative. Thus, providing consum-
ers with beneficial health-related information should be distinguished
from compelled funding of anti-industry ads, which unnecessarily vio-
late the First Amendment right to remain silent.
144 See generally, Murphy, supra, note 3.
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